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Abstract 
In this paper I discuss the morphological evolution of the European states. In Europe, processes of evolution toward modern 
states began in the late middle ages and continued throughout the modern times. Different nations may have had different 
experiences in their processes but they all took the same direction and went through similar stages of evolution, which displayed 
a distinct characteristic of order. Thus we see the four steps in the evolution: feudalism, absolute monarchy, aristocratic 
dominance, and the “popular” formula. To me the orderly proceeding is a phenomenon of high importance claiming for serious 
studies. By looking back to the history of European countries I try to explain the phenomenon and discuss the mechanism in it. 
Formation of modern states in Europe demonstrates a conspicuous feature of stage-by-stage development during the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism. This stage-by-stage development is striking not only in that the political form of every stage 
represents the need of the then society but also in that almost every state in Europe has experienced the same stage-by-stage 
development, moving from one stage to the next according to a certain sequence. Despite the different pace and different modes 
in different countries, the sequence of the stages is almost the same. This propels us to wonder whether there is inevitable logic in 
this phenomenon. If so, what can we draw from it? The present paper is an attempt to dig into this phenomenon and make some 
interpretations of its possible implications. 
© 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Feudal System 
John Roberts, former editor of The English Historical Review, once remarked: “Two basic ideas underlie the 
political structure of the modern world. One is that its land surface should be divided into areas unified under 
independent authorities with the last word about what goes on inside their well-defined boundaries. The other is that 
such areas should be lived in when possible by people possessing a sense of community which constitutes 
nationhood or nationality.” i  Here mentioned were the two most important factors of modern state, i.e., state 
sovereignty and national integration. Only when it possessed these two factors could a political entity be viewed as a 
state in the modern sense. A realm in medieval Europe, however, possessed neither sovereignty nor integration. 
Medieval Europe was a vast community consisting of not “nations” but “territories” which were loosely connected 
by the cultural and ideological ties of Christianity. Because of the practice of feoffment, every feudal lord, big or 
small, treated his fief as private property and exerted on it almost full power of jurisdiction and administration. This 
circumstance resulted in two consequences. First, a “realm” meant a geographical land, that is to say, it referred only 
to a specific region and did not mean a “state”. For example, England referred to the region named England, and the 
France the region named France. There was no overlapping between territory and sovereignty. Therefore, the notion 
of “state sovereignty” did not exist. In fact, there were many manors within any land, with each manor being a 
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quasi-independent political unit. A realm may have a monarch as its nominal super-authority (overlord), yet even in 
this case, he treated the realm as nothing more than his private estate, which was divided into pieces and granted as 
fiefs. As custom, the monarch usually handed down fiefs to his vassals with all power on it. In this view he was the 
peer of his vassals with the exception that from him the very process of feoffment was started. As a result, the 
foremost prominent feature of a medieval realm was the lack of power centralization and the mechanism of central 
power—in case “capital”, the seat for a central government, was nowhere. As territory and power were indefinitely 
dispersed in the process of infeudation and subinfeudation, no land in the hierarchical structure were strong enough 
to form a stable eco-political entity. Political power in medieval Europe was established on the basis of homage and 
fealty. Allegiance to a “state” was unknown at the time. 
As society remained loose, the notion of “nation” was very obscure. This led to the second consequence, i.e., a 
lack of direct linkage between the right to rule and the national identity. In other words, anyone could be granted a 
fief theoretically according to the practice of feoffment. This “anyone” could be a member of any national identity, 
once enfeoffed, he went to the position to share part of the power of the realm. For instance, in medieval Europe, the 
king of England for one time possessed two thirds of the French territory, which meant that although he was 
nominally a vassal of the French king, the king of England actually enjoyed two thirds of political power in France, 
which he distributed in turn among his own vassals. These vassals could be English nobles who followed their king 
to France or French nobles who swore allegiance to the king of England. So the intersected distribution of power 
depended not upon national identity but upon fief granting and the corresponding oaths of homage and fealty. 
Similar cases could be found everywhere in feudal Europe. The Habsburg family of Austria for a long time not only 
ruled Austria and several small Italian duchies and marquisates but also succeeded to the thrones of Bohemia 
(Czech) and Hungary. The Electors of Brandenburg acquired part of the Polish territory, became a vassal of Poland, 
and thus had a share of power in the Kingdom of Poland. To conclude, the Europeans in the Middle Ages cared 
more about the lord to whom they belonged and the territory where they dwelled than about whether their lord was a 
member of their own “nation”. It was a time when neither lords nor vassals were identified by nationalities. 
The severity of power split in medieval Europe could not be fully comprehended if the temporal power of the 
Roman Catholic Church in Western Europe was not taken into consideration. The church as an international 
organization exerted two types of power, the first being the power to levy a tax of one-tenth of the output of all 
Catholic countries (tithe), the second being the power to exert judicial discretion on things and persons (clergy as a 
group included) concerning the church. So, the church was not only an international religious organization, but also 
an international power structure. For a long time the church had even proclaimed its authority supreme. 
The whole political history of medieval Europe is summed up in the division of powers between the king and the 
church, and between the nobility and the monarchy, both of which plunged Europe into a state of division and 
disintegration for nearly one thousand years when there was no power centralization but power disintegration, thus 
making impossible economic development and even the impulse of economic development which called for the 
protection of centralized power. Compared with other civilizations around the world, Europe was comparatively less 
developed. One of the major reasons was that power was too dispersed in Europe. Germany provided the 
characteristic sample of feudal division. After about a hundred years prosperity since foundation, the “Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation” dissolved into a loose federation of principalities, where the aristocracy enjoyed 
almost total authority over territories, exercising power of coining money, enacting laws, executing government, and 
even declaring wars against each other. Germany was thus plunged into the abyss of suffering and became a 
politically dark and economically weak region that the European powers finally turned into a cockpit. As a result, 
Germany lagged behind in its modern developments, always obsessed by the aftereffects of its disintegration from 
the Middle Ages. This is a grave lesson people can draw from the history. Even in medieval England where power 
was comparatively centralized, the rivalry between the king and the nobles never ceased. During the two hundred 
years from the 13th century to the 15th century, England was bogged down in endless wars, wars of internal strife or 
for obtaining foreign territories. 
To sum up, social progress and economic development were hampered to a great extent by the feudal power 
structure which split the whole society into fragments and failed to act as an integrating force to propel social 
development. The demand for development calls for a centralization of power. Samuel Huntington once remarked: 
Rationalization of authority and centralization of power were prerequisites not only of unification but also of social 
evolution. Centralization of power was demanded to eradicate feudal prerogatives and bondages, and to provide 
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ground for the rise of new social blocs and for the development of new economic activities.ii The conclusion drawn 
here is that centralization of power is a prerequisite to social progress. 
From Feudalism to Absolutism 
In an earlier book I used to write: “A modern country must be unified, because if not unified, it is not possible to 
mobilize the manpower and material resources of the country to form a unified strength.... In Europe, unification 
means eradicating feudalism, ending the dominant role of nobility, restricting their influence, and most important of 
all, depriving them of their ruling power over their own fief. In one word, the political power must be centralized 
and put into the hands of central government.” iii Therefore, one of the prerequisites of unification is the 
centralization of power in the name of “nation”. In late Middle Ages the only force that could perform the task of 
unification was monarchy, the figurehead of the realm. 
Though nominal, monarch was at the pinnacle of a pyramid that shaped the feudal hierarchy. This gave him the 
potential advantage to forge a nation and execute the function of a “state”. Naturally, it was of utmost benefit for 
him to place the whole domain under his real control. For this reason he would try his best to extinguish any force 
which might threaten his power. His trimming effort, as it happened, helped to push forward the process of 
unification. As monarch’s personal interest overlapped with the interest of the nation at this stage, unification was 
achieved by an alliance between the crown and the nation with monarch swinging the leadership of the movement. 
Centralization made king’s power absolute while absolute power is a necessity to repress separatist forces. The 
transition from estate monarchy to absolute monarchy was the first of the progressive stages when a country evolved 
into its modern transition in Europe. 
Monarch spared no efforts to exploit his advantage of being the representative of the land. At a time when 
national consciousness sprouted it is easy for him to claim that what he did was for the sake of the nation. For 
example, he could declare that his wrestling with another king was a national fighting against another nation. On the 
other hand at the time when “nation” was only started to grow it had no choice but to seek protection from 
monarchy. Thus gradually, the obligation of an overlord to protect his vassals evolved into a king’s responsibility to 
protect his subjects—the “nation”. In this way the monarchy became absolute.  
Absolute monarchy first emerged in the Iberian Peninsular in late 15th century, with Spain as its quintessence. 
During the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, “the medieval administration was transformed by a long and gradual 
process into that of a Renaissance state”, and “the central principle around which all the reforms revolved was the 
concentration of power in the Crown.”iv Centralization started in England and France almost at the same time, that 
led Francis Bacon make his famous remark that Henry VII of England, Louis XI of France and Ferdinand II of 
Spain as “three wises” of modern states. After that, more or less, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Russia &c began 
centralized and the tendency of absolutism extended to such territories as Low Land countries, the Sicily and parts 
of the central and south Europe from 16—18th centuries. As a result, absolute monarchy took over Europe as the 
main power structure. 
As absolute monarchy spread its dominance those that had ended internal disintegration became great powers. 
Spain and Portugal were the first among those and were the“superpowers” of the time. They partitioned the world 
into spheres of influence. Later on Britain and France did the same, with one controlling the sea and the other 
dominating the continent. Other countries such as Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Russia flaunted their superiority 
one after another, with each holding sway over a region. For instance, the ruling family of Habsburg almost took 
dominance over half of Western Europe from Maximilian I to Charles V. Even as late as in the 17th century the 
Habsburg Monarchy was still the only power in Central Europe because of is centralized power structure. 
Burgess was important in centralization of power since they overlapped their interests with that of the monarchy. 
Medieval cities in Western Europe were alien forces to the feudal society. Cities not only provided a unique 
economic system, but also possessed a unique political structure. 
They were out of the enfeoffment system while market economy protected by self-rule civic government called 
for strong political power. Thus, in his way to centralization the king acted in alliance with cities to fight against the 
aristocracy. The above-mentioned “three wises” each and all drew help from cities in overwhelming their 
opponents. For example, by winning the support of the cities Ferdinand of Spain successfully thwarted the resistance 
of the feudal lords. Karl Marx wrote: “The centralized state power... originates from the days of absolute monarchy, 
serving nascent middle class society as a mighty weapon in its struggle against feudalism.” v  Yet, though 
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overlapping, the monarch’ interests differed significantly from that of the burgess, which brewed conflicts and 
struggles within the absolute monarchy. 
Ironically, when monarchy justified its claim on base of ending war chaos it seemed that it self was produced and 
strengthened by wars. The Spanish monarchy came into being in wars to expel the Moors. The English monarchy 
was born on the ruins of the War of the Roses. The French monarchy was consolidated by numerous wars, each of 
which tended to strengthen its absolute power. The logic of history seems to be: The more arduous it is in gaining an 
absolute rule, the more solid an absolute rule tends to be. France provides the best case in point. France was once 
reduced to the brink of subjugation and faced a national crisis during the Hundred Years’ War, yet the French 
monarchy finally won the fight and consequently obtained unprecedented authority, placing for the first time in 
history the whole country under its dominance. From then on, the monarchy had been repeatedly challenged by 
great noblemen who launched one war after another to oppose the Crown, yet each of the wars ended with the 
strengthening of the monarchy more powerful than before. In the 18th century the French monarchy was the model 
of absolutism. It may be safely concluded that the more violent the separatist wars were launched, the harder a 
mission the unification movement had to meet; in turn, it was more necessary to call for an absolute power. 
England was lucky because, as the result of the War of the Roses, the old styled military nobility disappeared 
thus made way for a new monarchy that was absolute. Since absolutism was a relatively easy achievement, it stayed 
on its basic level, with a minimum power of centralization. Richard Hooker, the famous Tudor jurist, once made a 
fine expatiation on absolutism, avowing that the royal power was absolute and the duty of subjects was to obey, but 
at the same time he made it plain that the absolute power was limited and must be refrained from unrestricted 
expansion. Therefore the absolute monarchy in England left an opening for the survival of “the natural rights from 
time immemorial”.vi From this we can see why England under the absolute monarchy still admitted local autonomy 
and did not keep a standing army. 
France was not so lucky because the nobility was too strong for the monarchy to be restrained. French monarchy 
turned out to be the most powerful as was in the reign of Louis XIV. It was impossible for a weak crown to realize 
and stabilize the national unification. So the spokesmen of the French absolutism would not remind their monarchs, 
as Hooker did mildly, of moderate exercise of power. Surely we know its motto was l’état c’est moi.
In Germany tendency of disintegration remained preponderant and centralization was postponed for too long. 
Relating to the 16th century France Frederick Engels thus remarked: “While in England, as well as in France, the 
rise of commerce and industry had brought about a linking of interests over the entire country, the political 
centralization of Germany had succeeded only in the grouping of interests according to provinces and around purely 
local centres.”vii This resulted in a split Germany, which, after experiencing numerous hardships, emerged as a 
unified state not until the second half of the 19th century. But when an authoritarian Germany (which was out of 
date) was forged by “blood and iron” other western countries had advanced far ahead in the course of modern 
political developments. Germany lagged behind for every step, and every step had to pay debts for previous lagging 
behind. 
In Europe, sooner or later, all countries had to be unified before they cross the threshold of modern states and 
absolutism was the pushing force of the progress. Therefore, absolute monarchy marks the starting point of modern 
states. If a country fails to replace the feudal system of political structure it cannot enter the modern world, which 
means a total failure in the first step toward modernization. Poland is a typical case in point. During the Middle 
Ages, Poland prospered for a time and even became a major power in Eastern Europe after its annexation of 
Lithuania in 1569. But the separatist nobles became more and more powerful at the same time when the royal power 
increased. In trying to strengthen its rule the Crown relied heavily on small nobles, ceding to them so many 
privileges that it could not control them in the end. The small nobles cared nothing but the interests of their small 
territories, and never bothered to appreciate the interest of the country. What they cared most was how to check the 
royal power and protect their privileges. From 1572 onward kings of Poland were elected by a nobility council and 
in 1652 nobles gained liberum veto (which made it possible for any member of the Sejm to prevent the passage of a 
law). As a result the Crown was not able to unite the nation and the natural link of unification was snapped. In 
Poland there was no absolute government while in Poland there formed no nation-state. In the time when in Europe 
nation-states competed fiercely, Poland could not keep a safe foothold but became a prey of other powers and was 
finally partitioned by the end of the 18th century. 
There were other parts of Europe that failed to evolve into nation-states, and consequently failed to catch up with 
the tide of history. As consequence they were annexed by their neighbouring powers. Their failure was due largely 
Qian Chengdan / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 41 (2010) 6683–6691 6687
to their inability to achieve the centralization of power to mobilize the national strength and guarantee their national 
survival. The price was dear: loss of national independence, and enslavement by aliens for decades or even hundreds 
of years. This was the case in many areas of southeast Europe, which fell into the hands of Habsburg Monarchy, the 
Ottoman Empire and czarist Russia. Germany and Italy, when succeeded in unifying their nations, narrowly escaped 
this fate and managed to rank among the world’s strong powers. However, late as it was, power transformation of 
the two countries produced great aftereffects which sowed the seeds of their abnormal experiences since. 
From Monarchy to Oligarchy 
The historical merits of absolutism were the end of disintegration and the start of a new political formula called 
“nation-state” though when these being done coercive forces were used. In other words, it coerced (though 
unconsciously) the nation into modern evolution and did this in the name of raison d’etat.
Politically, raison d’etat meant that the absolute government was the crowning authority, which admitted of no 
challenge. What absolutism cared most was to maintain order and regard order as the paramount principle of the 
state. So the royal power was regarded as absolute, and the monarch was equated with the state, which could be best 
displayed in the person of Louis XIV. Whether the monarch was wise or stupid his decision, right or wrong, had to 
be obeyed by the whole nation. That is to say, there was only one center in the country, and any attempt to deviate 
from the center was regarded as treason. This was a willy-nilly choice of the nascent nation which had just dragged 
itself out of the chaos of feudal disintegration and was badly in need of consolidation. As a Venetian observer of 
early Tudor England put it, “During the last twenty years, three princes of the blood, four Dukes, forty Earls, and 
more than three hundred other persons have died by violent death.” Therefore, the English had no intention to go 
back to chaos of war and were enthusiastic in standing by the recently established new monarchy. “Take away order 
from things,” said Sir Thomas Elliot in his Booke Named the Governour, “what then should remain?” The amazing 
fact that the book went through ten editions between 1531 and 1600 showed how the English responded 
sympathetically to its author.viii With popular support, governments found it fully justified to take all measures to 
maintain order, including building of army and police, policies of atrocious repression and a strong hand 
overwhelming the whole nation. These measures usually worked and even won wide support, the reason here was 
that the nation during this period still had a fresh memory of the sufferings inflicted by chaos so it had a strong crave 
for stability and a wish to avoid new nightmare. 
Economically, the greatest achievement absolutism could make was to promote a unified market and to direct 
national economy in the principle of raison d’etat, which resulted in state directed policy of mercantilism. 
Commerce was in the interest of the government, trade thus became the most precious treasure of the state. The 
French historian Daniel Halevy was typical in remarking that it was the mercantilists who invented the nation and 
not in the contrary.ix The basic principle of mercantilism was that the wealth of a nation depended primarily on the 
possession of precious metals. Jean Baptiste Colbert, Louis XIV’s chief minister of finance, used to say that the 
prosperity and magnitude of a nation is definitely measured by the amount of silver it possesses, and the Spanish 
mercantilist Don Elando Calino once said to Philip III: Everything moved around silver, upon silver his Majesty’s 
strength relied.x
In order to obtain and retain gold and silver, the state must spare no efforts to expand exports and reduce imports, 
accumulated metals from trade balance and stored them in treasury. Production thus must be promoted to meet 
domestic demands on one hand to prevent loss of gold and silver and to provide enough outputs for export on the 
other hand to secure inflow of the metals. At the same time, tariff barrier was necessary to protect home commerce; 
colonies were essential to provide both market and raw materials. State played a prominent role in carrying out 
mercantilist policies, without the support of the state their implementation was impossible. With mercantilism 
propelled by the absolute governments, England and France (and Spain in one sense) accomplished their primitive 
accumulation of capital. Therefore, absolutism in its early stage was used to help promoting capitalism. 
However, the notion of raison d’etat also implied an overlapping of monarchy and state, with the monarchy 
equating itself with the state and treating the state as its possession just as father to his family. The state was thus 
placed in the hands of one person. Louis XIV’s motto l’état c’est moi was, with no exception, the portraiture of all 
absolute monarchs. King Fredrick William I of Prussia even asserted that the king was the only man who knew what 
was best for his subjects. “The King was justified in using extreme methods to achieve his goals,” he said. Later, 
when the “divine right” of the crown went out of date and was replaced by “enlightened absolutism”, the idea l’état 
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c’est moi was still inveterate. Joseph II of Austria, the most “enlightened” of all enlightened monarchs in Europe, 
regarded absolute power as fundamental to his rule and never wavered a bit over it.xi
Centralization of power demanded the arrangement of equating the crown with the state, with executive, 
legislative and judiciary powers all put into the hands of the monarchy that became the personified representative of 
the state. Starting from the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella Spain formulated a governmental system of royal 
councils responsible only to the crown and established the Inquisition as a nationwide judiciary institution. Philip II 
of Spain concentrated every bit of power into his own hands and was meticulous over detail, attending to every 
single state affair, no matter big or small. When he could not preside in person he would superintended his 
ministers.xii The English Parliament passed in 1533 the Act in Restraint of Appeals, proclaiming that the king had 
“plenary, whole, and entire power”, and that the “body politic, compact of all sorts and degrees of people, divided in 
terms, and by names of spirituality and temporality” ought to “bear a natural and humble obedience” unto the king. 
The French Kings proclaimed to “act as the ministers of God and as His lieutenants on earth.”xiii Louis XIV not only 
worked hard at his “business of being king”, but also served as his own prime minister. Prussian kings, Austrian 
emperors and the Russian Czars were all omnipresent rulers without exception. King Frederick II, the 
overwhelmingly praised “enlightened” prince of Prussia, though moderately claiming himself to be “not the absolute 
master, but only the first servant of the state”, forbade any initiatives from his officials, demanding them “to carry 
out my orders, not to interfere.”xiv Under these circumstances it was too easy for the monarchy to be sanctified and 
all monarchs were indeed decorated as perfect. For example, a Spanish proverb went like this: “The King to his 
subjects, the rain to the land.” Louis XIV was acclaimed as “the Sun King”, which implied that everything on earth 
could not live without the sun. However, the propaganda of the irrational “divine right” was apparently absurd in the 
age of enlightenment. For this reason the “enlightened monarch” was varnished as “philosopher king” as if he was 
the embodiment of philosophy and reason. 
Referring to the rule by one man, the Prussian reformist politician Baron Stein once observed: “As long as a great 
man was at the head of the state, guiding it with spirit, strength and uniformity, the system produced good and 
brilliant results which hid from view much that was patched up and unfinished.”xv Absolutism was such a regime: 
When the ruling monarch was energetic, deliberate and far-sighted, he could decorate his state splendidly as if there 
were no flaws, then he would claim that he was the state and that it was due to his rule that the state prospered. But 
crisis lay low on the base. The success of absolutism depended entirely on the existence of a “great man” who 
happened to be there. He must be exceptionally wise, totally immune to error and unconditionally take the interest of 
the nation as his own. But it was almost impossible for a person to be this. A monarch tended to lead the state astray 
since to err was human; he could not completely overlap his private interest with that of the nation even if he was 
the greatest statesman ever since—nobody was immune to self-interest. More often than not, the monarch would 
replace the national interest with his private interest, and submit the nation to his power. So the basic paradox of 
absolute monarchy lay in that sooner or later the royal power would run counter to the interest of the nation and 
when this happened the confrontation against the monarchy took on a national nature—a denial of the monarch’s 
assumption that he was the “representative” of the nation. The wisdom of the monarch was entirely rested with the 
extent to which he matched his own interest with that of the nation. When difference arose, he must try his best to 
cover it up; when it could not be covered up, he must not let it run wide to the extent of fierce confrontation. In 
Baron Stein’s words, the government must “hide from view much that was patched up and unfinished.” When Stein 
was in office, Prussia was in crisis. He managed a limited reform and achieved limited achievements. There were 
similar “patching up” efforts in other absolute states. The results were also similar: a limited reform with a limited 
success which could not provide a final solution to the problem. 
In fact, absolutism had insurmountable internal paradox which could not be resolved by itself. The absolute 
monarch considered himself to be the representative of the nation, claimed himself to be the state, and hence gripped 
the power of the state. Yet to what extent did a monarch represent the nation? When he pursued the policy of 
mercantilism, the monarch wanted no more than to snatch gold and silver to replenish the stocks so as to meet the 
royal expenditure and to support his unceasing wars. But the nation, disgusted with the extravagance of the court 
and the whimsical dynastic wars, wanted to check the expenditure of the court and the wars. In order to claw money 
the monarch would levy new taxes and practice monopoly, otherwise precious metals collected from other countries 
would not flow into the purse of the monarch. As a result, the state treasury was not national but royal. The wealth 
accumulated in the name of the state did not belong to the nation but was appropriated by the ruling dynasty. The 
nation, after having been shaped into a state, was not willing to see this happen forever. 
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In order to guarantee effective rule, the monarch also had to build a bureaucratic apparatus which turned out to be 
another malignant parasite exploiting the nation. Bureaucratic apparatus such as the Spanish Royal Councils, the 
French “Intendants of the Judiciary, the Police and the Treasury”, the Prussian “General Superior Directory for 
Finance, War, and Domains”, and the Austrian “Supervising Department of Public and Royal Affairs” were organs 
of power responsible only to the monarch, which easily developed a tendency to deceive their superiors and delude 
their subordinates, and a tendency of embezzlement and corruption. Embezzlement of public funds and negligence 
of duty had always been common, and therefore invited popular resentment. The monarch knew perfectly well that 
these circumstances would do harm to the state and to himself, yet he had to rely on these bureaucrats to exercise his 
rule and hence turned a blind eye to them. The French absolute government, when plunged into grave financial 
crises, attempted more than once to rectify the working style of the officials and to eradicate embezzlement, but 
always came out at the small end of the horn and smothered up. In 1661 Louis XIV set up a court to try those 
corrupting officials, and had only to drop it eight years later for no other reason than that it aroused too much panic 
among the officials. 
In addition, it was not always the “great man” who steered the course of absolutism. On the contrary, under 
absolute rule, nonentities were raised to the pinnacle of power, who, together with their ignorance, set their own 
tastes as the standard and led the state astray. The Austrian emperor Ferdinand I thought that the carriages on the 
post road were always not loaded to capacity, therefore there was no need to build an railroad—a typical example of 
how a state was draggled by the ignorance of its ruler. Even if the state was in the hand of a “great man”, there was 
nothing that could guarantee his always staying on the sound track since he could be easily blinded by his 
unrestrained power. King Louis XIV was outstanding among absolute monarchs, yet he was over-ambitious and 
became unrealistic in his later years when he acted willfully and dragged France into endless wars, thus draining the 
country to the brink of bankruptcy. 
Finally, let us consider absolutism in the light of the development of capitalism. Capitalism was such an 
economic system that prospered on endless expansions. When it developed to a certain stage, capitalism had an 
intrinsic desire to cross the national boundary and establish an international market. Absolute monarchy was not 
guarantee for these expansions but tended to control them to meet its own interest. within the national boundary it 
always set restrictions on economic activities, favored those sectors beneficial only to the royal family, granted 
monopoly to favorers, controlled the prices of commodities or set back technological innovations and so on while 
without the boundary it is not unusual for the monarchy to bargain national interest for dynastic exchange. True that 
it once tallied with national interest, it now became a barrier to further development of capitalism and must be 
removed. Fernand Braudel, the famous French historian, once remarked on the relationship between absolute state 
and capitalism: It was true that the state used to help capitalism, but it was also true that the state could pose as a 
barrier to the development of capitalism and capitalism in return would do damage to the interest of the state.xvi
Therefore, as soon as it survived its nascent stage, capitalism found itself in acute confrontation with absolutism 
and could no longer endure the chains of absolute rule. To put it in another way, after sharing the honeymoon with 
the nation, the absolute state then began to hamper the growth of economy and became a stumbling block to the 
progress of the nation. 
When this happened, European countries found it their major task to break away from the bondage of absolutism. 
Those that took the lead in walking this step would run the tide and got prepared for modern economic takeoff while 
those that were slow would suffer a lot of setbacks and those that failed to accomplish this transformation would lag 
behind the trend and encounter a series of problems. 
To be specific, England accomplished this transformation in the 17th century and became the first to overthrow 
absolute rule. Therefore it mounted on the right track of rapid economic growth in the 18th century. France followed 
the suit. But absolutism in France was too strong, only to be overcome with greater efforts. In doing so France also 
had to face the challenges of industrialization posed by England. Lowland countries and the Scandinavian countries 
experienced a relatively smooth transformation but Spain and Portugal, the two countries which had first established 
absolute rule, dropped out in this trend and declined rapidly. These two countries were so cast down that they fell 
behind the ranks up to the 20th century, only to show signs of recovery after the Second World War. Austria was 
once the strongest among the German states, yet it declined rapidly just because of its failure to cross the threshold 
of the transformation. Absolute power was also strong in Prussia, but the Junkers, the landed gentry in Prussia, 
tolerated the absolute power but on the other hand rose to the occasion to lead modernization by not only unifying 
Germany but also leading Germany on to the road of militarism in its industrialization. 
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As conclusion, all changes in the transformation led to one result, that is, a shift from monarchical absolutism to 
aristocratic oligarchy. 
From Notables Rule to Popular Rule 
Absolutism was usually overcome and replaced by aristocratic government known as oligarchy. Under absolute 
monarchy power was controlled in the hands of one man; under oligarchic government a small group of people 
manipulated state power and wielded them by a mutual compliance with certain rules of game. These people 
checked each other to balance the power; therefore there was no power center of one man. Reasons for this power 
mechanism might be sought in the following three aspects: first, aristocratic oligarchy and absolutism were both in 
essence a structure of power upward directed. When absolutism aborted the political inertia kept the direction intact. 
Second, the economic resources of the country were maintained in the hands of the small group—the nobles, who 
possessed the economic lifeline that is land. Third, the nobles had the advantage of access to power center under 
absolute rule. They were the coadjutants of the monarch. Once the diffusion of power began to happen, they became 
the first beneficiaries. Even when the French Revolution had annihilated the nobles, France was still ruled by a 
group of bigwigs in the subsequent half a century not withstanding the fact that they were not “nobles”. 
England was one of the first few countries which established modern aristocratic rule. The English aristocracy 
launched the “Glorious Revolution”, overthrew the absolutism of the restoration and established a new political 
structure with the parliament as the center of power. With this structure, the monarch lost real power which in fact 
had been transferred into the hands of scores of nobles and a few dignitaries who could manipulate a parliamentary 
majority. As H. H. Asquith, the British Prime Minister in early 20th century, put it, Britain had “a well established 
tradition of 200 years, that, in the last resort, the occupant of the Throne accepts and acts upon the advice of his 
ministers”+xvii Dignitaries controlled the government by manipulating Parliament to form a new system called 
Constitutional Monarchy. 
The English system soon became a model imitated by other European countries because it was accompanied by 
the rapid economic growth. In the first half of the 18th century, Britain had a stable government, which guaranteed a 
smooth development of economy. With this prerequisite the Industrial Revolution started in Britain in the second 
half of the century. Britain had inaugurated a new era of industrialization, and its great economic achievements 
naturally drew the attention of many other European countries. Many people attributed Britain’s economic success 
to its system, by which the French Philosophers were particularly attracted. For example, Voltaire’s Letters on the 
English (also known as The Philosophical Letters) was written based on his experiences in exile in England. 
Montesquieu, when conceiving his idealistic monarchy, drew the blueprint from the English one. Locke’s doctrine 
of “unalienable natural rights” had a great impact not only on France but also on Europe and the whole world. 
Because of the example of Britain, many European countries strove with unswerving vigor to overcome absolutism 
and establish constitutional government. France, after going through the test of the French Revolution, finally 
established a kind of constitutional government by the “July Revolution”, whose success inspired people of other 
countries with unbounded confidence. From then on to the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century, struggle for constitutional government became an inevitable trend which swept the world like a storm from 
the west to the east. 
In fact, oligarchy did not necessarily take the form of constitutional monarchy. There were other forms such as 
the Dutch Republic of the United Provinces which was established after the overthrow of the Spanish rule, and the 
French Third Republic (the so-called “Republic of the Dukes”). Therefore, it was the common experience in 
European countries that the overcome of absolute monarchy usually led to an oligarchic rule. 
It was during the period of oligarchic rule that modern industry prospered and economic takeoff happened. This 
is a phenomenon that calls for special attention. The phenomenon is a fact although cannot so far be explained by 
theory. The Industrial Revolution started in England during the “supremacy of the aristocracy” (in the 18th century) 
and in France after the “July Revolution”. Even in Prussia, there was no rapid development of industry until (though 
to a great extent a masquerade of) “constitutional government” had been established. The case was similar in 
countries in the Lowlands and in Northern Europe, where industrialization started earlier. Conversely, in countries 
like Spain and Austria which failed to overcome absolutism, industrialization was not launched smoothly. 
Industrialization brought about great social changes, the most important of which was the formation of two 
totally new social classes, namely the industrial middle class and the industrial working class. These two classes 
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were brought up by the industrial mode of production and controlled the economic lifeline of the industrialized 
countries. With the formation the old balance within society was broken and it meant no longer possible for a few 
people to maintain their monopoly of power. Economic growth achieved under the oligarchic system turned out to 
be the decisive force to deny it. A new stage of political change therefore set in. At this stage, a popular form of 
government was demanded so that people, as many as possible, could participate in national political life. What 
really mattered was not whether this popular participation was of any practical significance, or whether the mass 
were willing to exercise their right, but that the mass had been granted the opportunity to participate at least in 
theory. In the process those countries, which took the lead in transformation, were to be the first to achieve social 
integration (that means: to integrate all social classes into the framework of the constitutional system), while those 
that suffered setbacks would experience a grave discord between economic and political developments which in turn 
aggravated social confrontation. In this stage, extension of political participation was the only way to maintain a 
harmonious society and at last became the conclusion of the transformation of European states. Though the way and 
pace of change varied in various countries the trend to popular politics proved unavoidable. 
In conclusion, transition of European states from feudal to modern state underwent several stages which every 
country has undergone or is still undergoing. Those that have made the smoothest (and usually the timeliest) turn at 
each of the stages can smoothly reach the present form of a modern state. Failure to make the turn at any of the 
stages results in not only grave setbacks in the whole process, but also a long delay to cross the threshold of the next 
stage. It seems impossible for any state to skip a certain stage; at least there seems to be no proof of this kind. It 
seems more impossible for any country to evade a certain stage since lag at one stage will reduce the state into a 
passive position in the subsequent stages. Heavy price tend to be paid to make up what has been missed in the 
previous stage. Germany provides the most typical case in point. Germany suffered so greatly because of its delay in 
walking the first step to form into a unified nation that it always walked the subsequent steps in a passive position 
and finally completed the whole process of transformation in a tough way that seems more tragic than comic. 
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